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MISUSING PROCEDURAL DEVICES TO DISMISS AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAWSU1T-Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990).
Abstract: In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, the Supreme Court
upheld a grant of summary judgment against the National Wildlife Federation for lack of standing. The Court held that the federation failed to
sufficiently claim specific injury to federation members. The Court also
stated in dicta that the federation's claims were not ripe for review. The
opinion does not apply precedent regarding summary judgment to the
standing inquiry, and fails to apply precedent regarding ripeness to the
facts of the case. This Note examines the reasoning of the Lujan Court,
and compares the results reached with those suggested by unapplied
precedents. Because applying the precedents would lead to a contrary
result that is more desirable for policy reasons, this Note concludes that
the Court erred in disregarding precedent. This Note suggests that
properly applying precedents would have led to more carefully considered agency decisions, greater protection of the environment, and closer
compliance with duly enacted laws by administrative agencies.
Presently my soul grew stronger;hesitating then no longer,
"Sir," said , "orMadam, truly your forgiveness I implore;
But the fact isI was napping, and so gently you came rapping,
And so faintly you came tapping, tapping at my chamber door,
That I scarce was sure I heard you"--here I opened wide the door;Darkness there and nothing more.
-Edgar Allen Poe'
The National Wildlife Federation (federation) came rapping at the
federal courts' door. The Supreme Court majority, however, found
that the federation did not have standing to come into court. This
Note examines the federation's claim in Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation.2 Because the federation had met the requirements for
standing, this Note concludes that the majority decision was mistaken.
In addressing the federation's standing, the majority failed to follow
Supreme Court precedent governing summary judgment. Had the
Court followed precedent, the Court would have held that the federal.From Poe, "The Raven," in THE POEMS OF EDGAR ALLEN PoE (F. Stovall ed. 1965).
2. 110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990). The suit made a long trek through the federal courts before
reaching the Lujan decision, beginning with a preliminary injunction from the district court.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 277 (D.D.C. 1985) (Burford1), aff'd, 835
F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Burford I1), on remand, 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988) (Burford
111), rev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir 1989) (Burford M), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 110 S.Ct. 3177 (1990).
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tion had established its standing sufficiently to defeat a summary judgment motion. The majority also failed to follow precedent in its
ripeness discussion. Had the Court applied this precedent, it would
have found that the federation's complaint concerned agency action
that was ripe for review. Failing to follow the applicable precedents
led the majority to reject a claim presenting genuine issues of fact that
were ripe for review. The Court should have applied these case precedents on summary judgment and ripeness and allowed the federation's
suit to proceed.
I.

THE STANDING AND RIPENESS DOCTRINES: ORIGINS
AND REQUIREMENTS

The federal standing doctrine ascertains whether a particular litigant is properly before the federal courts.' The doctrine applies both
to individual plaintiffs and to organizations suing on their members'
behalf.4 The United States Supreme Court has described standing as a
determination of whether a plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in
the outcome of a case.' To determine a plaintiff's stake in a case, the
Court uses a two-part system which considers constitutional requirements and court-imposed "prudential" concerns.6 To have standing, a
plaintiff must satisfy both the constitutional and prudential
requirements.
Unlike standing, ripeness focuses primarily on the issues presented
and not on the party bringing a claim.7 The ripeness doctrine ascertains whether agency action is sufficiently complete and the issues sufficiently defined' to allow effective court intervention without
disrupting the agency's decisionmaking process.9 Issues that are sufficiently defined are ripe for review.

3. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984).
4. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977)
(organizations may have standing on their members' behalf if members would have standing on
their own, the organizations' interests are germane to the issue, and individual members'
participation is not necessary).
5. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
7. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 21.01 (1972) [hereinafter DAVIS

TEXT].
8. See 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
[hereinafter DAVIS TREATISE].

LAW TREATISE § 25.1, at 350 (2d ed. 1983)

9. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
A.

The Standing Doctrine

The standing doctrine derives from the "case or controversy"
requirement in article III of the United States Constitution.'" Article
III prohibits federal courts from hearing cases where no specific and
discernable injury exists." The prohibition bars advisory opinions,' 2
friendly suits, 3 and political suits.' 4 The Supreme Court also has
ruled that the Constitution requires a plaintiff to prove he or she has
an injury caused by the defendant's alleged action, redressible by the
relief sought from the court.' If the plaintiff cannot prove such injury
in fact,' s the plaintiff lacks standing and the federal courts cannot
7
review the case.
Federal courts also address prudential concerns when deciding if a
party has standing.'" These concerns involve whether the courts'
proper functions will be fulfilled by hearing a plaintiff's case.19 Only if

the constitutional minimums are met will the courts consider prudential concerns.2 0 The prudential concerns generally bar a plaintiff from
bringing a case asserting third parties' rights or involving generalized
grievances shared by widespread parts of the population. 2 '
B. Standing Under the Administrative ProcedureAct
The standing question arises when a plaintiff complains of government agency action.2 2 To sue an agency, the plaintiff must show that
10. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, el. 1. Detailing the intricacies of the standing doctrine is beyond
the scope of this Note. Many qualified commentators have addressed the issue in depth. See,
e.g., Fletcher, The Structure of Standing 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Fallon, Of justiciability,
Remedies, and PublicLaw Litigation:Notes on the Jurisprudenceof Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1

(1984).
11. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTruTIONAL LAW § 3.7 (2d ed. 1988)
(discussing article III limits on federal court jurisdiction).
12. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
13. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943).
14. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
15. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); see also Fletcher, supra note 10, at 224-28 (discussing origins of
modem standing law).
16. "Injury in fact" is the term used by the Court to describe the type of injury, caused by
defendant and redressible by the courts, which is necessary to meet the constitutional
prerequisites for standing. See Valley Forge 454 U.S. at 473; see also Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
17. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 473.
18. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
19. Id.
20. See id. at 498-99.
21. See, eg., Valley Forge 454 U.S. at 474-75. The zone of interest test is also a prudential
concern. It is discussed infra at notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
22. Eg., L. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 3.14, at 107.
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some statute permits an injured party to seek judicial review.2 3 A
plaintiff may be able to sue an agency pursuant to a citizen suit provision within a statute, which expressly gives injured citizens standing to
sue agencies. 24 Absent a citizen suit provision, certain types of agency
action are reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).2 5 Section 702 of the APA allows judicial review of agency
action for parties "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute. 2 6
27
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,
the Supreme Court made its first ruling on judicial review under the
APA. Sellers of data processing services sought review of a decision
by the Comptroller of the Currency which allowed national banks to
sell data processing services. 28 The Court held that the APA required
the plaintiffs to satisfy a two-part test to show standing.2 9 First, the
plaintiffs had to demonstrate an injury in fact stemming from the
agency action.3 ° Second, the plaintiffs had to show that the statute the
agency action allegedly violated included the plaintiffs within its statutorily protected zone of interest.3 ' Because competition from the
banks threatened the plaintiffs' profits, the Court found they were
injured in fact.32 The plaintiffs also fell within the zone of interest
protected by a statute forbidding banks to perform non-banking services, because the statute was intended to prohibit unfair competition
by banks.33 Under Data Processing, the APA allowed judicial review
of injuries that were neither recognized at common law nor specifically
protected by some statute other than the APA.3 4
23. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
24. See, eg., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1988) (allowing citizens to bring suits to enforce federal water
pollution control statutes).
25. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1988). The APA was enacted to
make all agencies follow uniform procedures in their actions. See DAVIS TEXT, supra note 7,
§ 1.04, at 9; see also Proceedings in the Senate of the United States, Administrative Procedure
Act of 1946, CoNG. REc. March 12, 1946, reprintedin ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcTLEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, at 298 (1946) (remarks of Senator McCarran explaining
purposes of the APA).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Although the APA allows judicial review of agency action, it does not
provide federal courts with jurisdiction to hear such cases. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105
(1977). Jurisdiction must be based on some other federal statute. See id at 105-07.
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28. Id. at 151.
29. Id. at 152-53.
30. Id. at 152.
31. Id. at 153.
32. Id. at 152.
33. Id. at 155-56.
34. Rights recognized at common law include property rights, contract rights, rights to be
free from tortious conduct, and rights specifically conferred by statute. !-g.,
Tennessee Elec.
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Supreme Court decisions following Data Processing showed that
non-economic injuries could suffice for standing. In Sierra Club v.
Morton,3' harm to aesthetic values was recognized as potentially sufficient to grant standing. In Sierra Club, an environmental group
sought 36
to enjoin the building of a ski resort in the Sequoia National
Forest.
Although the Court denied standing to the Sierra Club
because it had not shown that any of its individual members would be
injured, the Court acknowledged that harm to the enjoyment of aesthetic and ecologic values could qualify as injury sufficient for standing
under the APA.37 Sierra Club shows that, provided the constitutional
requirements for standing are met, courts can review any agency
action that injures a statutorily protected interest.
C. The Ripeness Doctrine
The ripeness doctrine allows agencies to make final decisions before
courts review their actions. Like standing, the ripeness doctrine is
derived from the "case or controversy" clause of article III.3 Ripeness prevents courts from hearing a complaint about agency action
that has not yet injured the plaintif.39 Until agency action causes
actual harm or an imminent threat of harm, courts hesitate to interfere
with agency decisionmaking.' This non-intervention approach allows
agencies to use their expertise without interference from the courts.4 1
When judicial review is sought through the APA, only final agency
action can be ripe for review.4 2
Ripeness is determined by a two-part test set forth in Abbott Labo4 3 First, are the issues fit for judicial review?'
Secratoriesv. Gardner.
ond, what hardship would the parties face if review is denied?4 5 The
Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939), overruled on other groun4
Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).

35. 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
36. Id' at 730.
37. Id at 734. A year after deciding Sierra Club, in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), the Court granted standing to plaintiffs whose
aesthetic interests were harmed. 412 U.S. 669, 689-90 (1973).
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see DAvIS TkRATisE, supra note 8, § 25.1, at 350.
39. See DAVIS TmTISE, supra note 8, § 25.1, at 350.
40. See i.; cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (ripeness
protects "agencies from judicial interference until" decisions are formal and parties affected "in a
concrete way").

41. See Abbott 387 U.S. at 148-49.
42.
43.
44.
45.

5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
387 U.S. at 149.
Id
Id
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plaintiffs in Abbott were pharmaceuticals manufacturers challenging a
labeling regulation promulgated by the Food and Drug Commissioner. Because the agency had not yet enforced the regulation, the
court of appeals held that the regulation was not ripe for review. 7
Applying the two-part test, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals' decision.4" Because the issues presented were questions of
law, the Court found they were fit for judicial review.49 The Court
held that the drug companies faced immediate hardship--costly compliance or potential fines for non-compliance. 50 The Abbott test
remains the benchmark for ripeness.5"
Informal agency action may also be ripe for review.5 2 Informal
agency action includes advisory letters, telephone calls, or agency policies carried out without adopting formal rules or orders. 3 The action
is ripe if it represents the agency's final view on a matter and has an
immediate effect on the plaintiff. 4 Determining whether informal
action is final involves the same factors as determining whether formal
action is final.5 5 If informal action represents the agency's final view,
judicial review will not risk interference
with agency
56
decisionmaking.
II.

STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Rule 56) allows a party to move
for summary judgment based on pleadings and evidence produced
through discovery.5 7 The summary judgment rule is designed to
assess the evidence to determine if a trial is necessary. 58 One purpose
of summary judgment is to allow a party to avoid defending against
46. Id. at 138-39.
47. Abbott Laboratories v. Celebrezze, 352 F.2d 286, 291 (3rd Cir. 1965), rev'd sub. norm.
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
48. Abbott, 387 U.S. 136, 149-54, 156.
49. Id. at 149-52.
50. Id. at 152-54.
51. See, eg., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3190, 3191 n.4 (1990).
52. See DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 8, § 25.14, at 402-03.
53. See DAVIS TEXT, supra note 7, § 4.01, at 88-90.

54. E.g., Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 929-30 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied,
429 U.S. 862 (1976).
55. See DAVIS TREATISE, supra note 8, § 25.14, at 402-03.

56. Cf. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (ripeness policy is to
protect courts from entanglement in ongoing agency decisionmaking).
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. A claimant may move for summary judgment after twenty days have
passed following commencement of the action. Id. 56(a). A defendant may move for summary
judgment at any time. Id. 56(b).
58. Id. 56(e) advisory committee's note to 1963 amendments.
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baseless claims.5 9 Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
significantly reduced the need for specific pleadings, 6 0 summary judgment is an especially important procedural device.61 Under Rule 56,
summary judgment shall be granted when the evidence presents "no
genuine issue as to any material fact."' 62 A non-moving party that
bears the burden of proof on an issue must come forth with evidence
beyond the pleadings, such as affidavits. 63 To avoid summary judgment, the opposing party must show that issues exist that require a
trial to resolve. 64 If summary judgment is granted, the suit is dismissed on the merits.6" Conversely, if summary judgment is denied,
the case proceeds to trial on the merits of the issues presented.66
Courts deny summary judgment if the evidence presented is subject
to conflicting interpretations.67 In United States v. Diebold, Inc.,68 the
Supreme Court held that, on summary judgment, inferences from facts
in affidavits must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. In Diebold, the government brought an antitrust suit
challenging Diebold's acquisition of another company's assets. 69 The
district court granted Diebold's summary judgment motion against
the government because the court held the acquisition did not implicate antitrust laws.70 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed
because the evidence could be read to infer that the acquired assets
were within the scope of the antitrust statutes.7 1 The Court held that
granting summary judgment was improper where the evidence could
reasonably support the claims of the non-moving party.7 2 Under this

59. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
60. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (a motion to dismiss based on the
pleadings should be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts" that would entitle the plaintiff to relief).
61. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
62. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c).
63. Id 56(e); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
64. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); cf 10 WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2712, at 563 (1983).
65. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 64, § 2712, at 584.
66. See id § 2712, at 587.
67. See ia § 2725, at 106-09, and cases cited therein.
68. 369 U.S. 654 (1962) (per curiam).

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id
Ia at 655.
Ia
/d
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standard, summary judgment is proper only if the evidence
cannot
73
reasonably be read to present an issue of disputed fact.
III. LUJAN V NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION
In 1985, the National Wildlife Federation sued the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and Robert Burford, director of the BLM,74
challenging the BLM's land withdrawal review program." The program involved revoking protective classifications and withdrawals of
federal land. These classifications and withdrawals protected federal
lands from development of resources such as oil, gas, and minerals. 6
The program affected over 180 million acres of federal land." The
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 197678
charged the BLM with reviewing all classifications and withdrawals
then existing. FLPMA enabled the BLM to remove those protections
under certain circumstances.7 9
Plaintiffs claimed that the BLM carried out the land withdrawal
review program without following certain procedural requirements of
FLPMA and the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) of
1969.80 These statutes require agencies to prepare statements detailing
the impacts of federal action on the environment prior to implement73. Cf Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (court must believe the
evidence of the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences within the party's evidence
in that party's favor).
74. The suit also named the Department of the Interior and the Secretary of Interior as
defendants. The Bureau of Land Management is an agency within the Department of Interior.
75. Joint Appendix to Parties' Briefs at 11, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177
(1990) (No. 89-640) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
76. Various laws allow private parties to gain rights in federal land for development. See, eg.,
Mining Act of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1988) (as amended in 1920). Several statutes gave the
executive branch the power to classify and withdraw federal land, controlling whether
development would take place on the federal lands. See, eg., Classification and Multiple Use
Act, Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 986 (1964) (expired 1969). For a detailed analysis of executive
withdrawals of federal land, see Getches, Managing the Public Land&- The Authority of the
Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279 (1982).
77. Joint Appendix, supra note 75, at 65, 103 (affidavits of BLM assistant director Jack
Edwards).
78. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988).
79. Id. at § 1714(l)(2) (the Secretary of Interior could recommend removal of withdrawals
where doing so would be consistent with the purposes of the programs that had originally led to
the withdrawals; after submission to the President, the recommendations could be carried out by
the Secretary).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988). The federation also claimed the program violated the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S.
Ct. 3177, 3184 (1990).
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ing the action,"1 and to prepare land use plans for public lands. 2 One
purpose of these statutes is to ensure that decisions affecting the environment consider those environmental effects and include public input
on the decisions."3 Because neither FLPMA nor NEPA have citizen
suit provisions, the federation sought judicial review through section
702 of the APA. s4 The federation complained that the program would
lead to destruction of fish and wildlife habitat through opening of the
public lands to mining and oil and gas exploration, thereby harming
federation members' enjoyment of the lands.85 Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against the program until the BLM prepared environmental impact statements and land use plans pursuant to NEPA
86
and FLPMA.
The District Court for the District of Columbia, in National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 7 ruled that the federation lacked standing
and granted summary judgment for the government."8 The court held
that the two affidavits of federation members submitted to establish
the federation's standing on its members' behalf did not present allegations of injury specific enough to survive a summary judgment
motion.89 The two affidavits claimed injury to two federation members resulting from withdrawal revocations in Wyoming and Arizona. ° Federation member Peggy Kay Peterson averred:
My recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of federal lands, particularly those in the vicinity of South Pass-Green Mountain, Wyoming
have been and continue to be affected in fact by the unlawful actions of
the Bureau .... In particular, the South Pass-Green Mountain area of
Wyoming has been opened to the staking of mining claims and oil and
81. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
82. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a), (d), (f).
83. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b), 4332(2)(C); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(a), 1739(e).
84. Lujan, 110 S. CL at 3185. Federal court jurisdiction was based on federal question
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), and on suit against officers of the United States, id. § 1346.
85. Joint Appendix, supra note 75, at 12 (plaintiff's amended complaint).
86. Ide at 22.
87. 699 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1988) (Burford III), rev'd, 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir 1989)
(BurfordfI), rev'd sub nom. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
88. Idk at 332. The district court had previously granted the federation a preliminary
injunction against the program. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 277
(D.D.C. 1985) (BurfordI), aff'1d 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (BurfordI1). The district court
here considered cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the parties while the case was
pending before the appellate court. Burford III, 699 F. Supp. at 328 n.2.
89. Burford III, 699 F. Supp. at 331-32.
90. IaL
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gas leasing, an action which threatens the aesthetic beauty and wildlife
habitat potential of these lands. 91

The district court held that the affiants did not show that they used
land actually affected by withdrawal revocation. 92 The court found
the affiants claimed only use of land "in the vicinity" of affected areas,
and their affidavits did not specify which parts of large land tracts they
actually used.

93

In National Wildlife Federation v. Burford,94 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that the federation had established sufficient standing to
survive a motion for summary judgment. 95 The court of appeals held
that the affidavits alleged specific facts when read along with the whole
record of the case. 96 The court remanded for trial on the merits, 97 but

the Supreme Court granted defendants' petition for a writ of
certiorari.98

In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, the Supreme Court held
that the federation lacked standing.99 In a five to four decision, the
Court held that the federation's affidavits were insufficient to show
injury to federation members, and presented no genuine issue of disputed fact for trial."°
In Lujan, the majority rejected the two affidavits as a basis for
standing because the affidavits did not present any specific facts sup91. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187 (1990). Federation member
Richard Erman's affidavit was similar to Peterson's, except that it pertained to withdrawal
revocations in Arizona. The court also rejected Erman's affidavit using similar reasoning.
Burford 111, 699 F. Supp. at 331-32.
92. Burford 11, 699 F. Supp. at 331-32.
93. Id.
94. 878 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Burford IV), rev'd sub norm Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
95. Id. at 430-31. The court declined to reinstate the preliminary injunction, reasoning that a
decision on the merits would soon be made. Id. at 425 n.2.
The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to accept four
additional affidavits submitted to support the federation's standing. Id. at 433. The affidavits
were filed after the deadline mandated for such filings by FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b). The Supreme
Court ruled that, under Rule 6(b), the district court had discretion to deny the affidavits. Lujan,
110 S. Ct. at 3191-93. This Note does not contest the Court's opinion on this ground.
96. Burford IV, 878 F.2d 422, 430-31.
97. Id. at 434.
98. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 834 (1990). Manuel Lujan, Secretary of the
Interior under President Bush, replaced Robert Burford as the named defendant.
99. 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189 (1990) Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, in which
Rehnquist, C.J., and White, O'Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Justice Blackmun wrote a
dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., joined.
100. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.

Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation
porting injury to the affiants. ° The majority adopted the district
court's language, finding that the affidavits did not show that the affiants' recreational use and enjoyment of the lands extended to those
lands actually affected by the program. 0 2 The court of appeals decision was overruled because that court had "assumed" that the affidavits embraced the specific facts necessary to present an issue for
trial."°3 The Lujan majority argued that granting standing based on
the affidavits would defeat the purpose of the summary judgment
rule-allowing a party to protest a baseless claim."°
The Lujan majority also found that the land withdrawal review program was not ripe for review. 10 5 The majority suggested in dicta that
even had the affidavits sufficed to show injury in fact, the federation
could not challenge the program as a whole because it was not "final
agency action."10 6 Under the APA, the BLM's program was not sufficiently defined to be ripe for review. 107 The majority noted that no
single order or rule was promulgated defining the program,10 8 and
described the program as continuously changing.' °9 Absent specific
definition, the program as a whole could not be ripe. 110 The majority
declared that judicial review could be obtained only for each separate
revocation of a withdrawal or classification. I The majority reasoned
that improvements of the program more extensive than simple review
of each revocation decision could only be made by the legislative and
12
executive branches.
The Lujan majority rejected the program as unripe for review based
on its desire to limit the judiciary's role in reviewing agency action.
The majority reasoned that plaintiffs seeking wholesale improvements
of agency action must seek congressional or agency intervention,
rather than judicial relief. 3 The Court emphasized that courts
101. Id
102. Id at 3188.
103. Id
104. Id at 3188-89.
105. In their ripeness discussion, the Court considered four additional affidavits submitted by
the federation. See supra note 96.
106. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189-91.
107. Id at 3190.
108. Id at 3189.
109. Id
110. Id at 3189 & n.2, 3190.
111. Id at 3191.
112. Id.
113. Id at 3190. Note that the federation had sought improvement from the agency, see
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (BurfordII), and that
Congress had attempted to improve land use decisions by enacting FLPMA and NEPA. 43
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should not intervene in agency action until it has been reduced to
manageable proportions and caused harm or an imminent threat of
harm to the plaintiffs.1 14 Because the program had not been sufficiently defined or caused imminent harm, judicial intervention was
1 15
improper.
Justice Blackmun, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens, argued that the federation had asserted specific facts sufficient to avoid summary judgment.1 16 The dissent found that the federation's affidavits, read as a whole, identified specific revocations of
withdrawals that had allegedly caused them harm.' t7 To support this
finding, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the BLM identified the revocations that the federation claimed caused it harm based on the affidavits. 1 8 The dissenters disclaimed having "presumed" any facts,
arguing that their reading drew inferences within the affidavits in favor
of the federation in accordance with Diebold." 9 Justice Blackmun
declined to address the issue of ripeness because it was not properly
before the Court. 20 The dissent would have remanded to the district
court to determine if the BLM's actions were in fact part of an overall

plan. 121
IV.

DISREGARDING PRECEDENT LED TO AN
UNDESIRABLE POLICY OF ALLOWING
AGENCIES TO SHIELD THEIR DECISIONS
FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation 2 2 improperly terminated a lawsuit. The decision affirmed a grant
of summary judgment where genuine issues of fact existed. The federation had standing to sue. Following the precedent set by United
States v. Diebold, Inc.,12 3 the Lujan Court should have refused summary judgment. Additionally, the issues raised were ripe for review
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988). The federation alleged that the
agency was not complying with the congressionally mandated programmatic improvements.
114. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3190.
115. Id. at 3191.
116. Id. at 3195 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 3196 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (citing the majority opinion at 3187).
119. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655
(1962)). For a discussion of Diebold, see supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
120. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3202 n.16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121, Id. at 3201-02 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
122. 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990).
123. 369 U.S. 654 (1962) (per curiam). For a discussion of Diebold, see supra notes 68-74
and accompanying text.
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2
under Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner."
By upholding summary
judgment against the federation, the majority misused summary judgment and the standing doctrine to achieve a goal of judicial restraint.

A.

The Affidavits PresentedSufficient Evidence of Standing

The Lujan majority disregarded precedent. By reading the federation affidavits supporting standing too narrowly, the majority ended a
lawsuit that presented genuine issues for trial. The majority should
have followed the rule expressed in Diebold:1 25 inferences within the
evidence submitted by a party opposing summary judgment must be
drawn in the light most favorable to that party. By failing to apply the
Diebold precedent, the majority held the federation to an overly strict
standard to defeat a summary judgment motion.
The Lujan majority mischaracterized the court of appeals' opinion
to show that federation members did not claim to use specific land.
The Lujan majority erroneously asserted that the court of appeals
assumed that general averments embraced specific facts. 12 6 To support that assertion, the Lujan majority innaccurately portrayed the
127
court of appeals' opinion by presenting part of it out of context.
The Court omitted the court of appeals' finding that Peterson's affidavit could refer only to the parts of the South Pass-Green Mountain
area not previously opened to mining. 12 8 By quoting the court of
appeals' opinion only partially, the majority implied that the court of
appeals read the affidavit to contain only general allegations. The
omitted language and other language in the court of appeals' decision
makes it clear that the court of appeals found that the affidavits alleged
1 29
specific facts.
The court of appeals inferred that the federation affidavits alleged
specific injuries. To reach this ruling, the court did not presume any
missing facts. In accordance with Diebold,the court inferred from the
affidavit that Peterson identified the land with respect to which she
was injured. 3 ' The court drew its inference from three undisputed
124. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). For a discussion of Abbott, see supra notes 43-51 and
accompanying text.
125. Diebold, 369 U.S. at 655; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
126. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3188.
127. Compare National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 878 F.2d 422, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(BurfordIV) with Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3188 (omitting court of appeals' language explaining that
reading Peterson's affidavit to claim use of specific land is logical).
128. Burford IV 878 F.2d at 431.
129. Id.; see also id. at 430 (the federation affidavits "clearly alleged facts showing that
[federation] members were 'among the persons injured'" by the program).
130. Id. at 431.
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premises. First, Peterson claimed to be injured.13 1 Second, she identified the source of her injury as the actions of the BLM in the South
Pass-Green Mountain area.1 32 Finally, the BLM's actions in the area
only affected 4500 acres.' 33 The court of appeals inferred that Peterson claimed injury because she used the affected 4500 acres. 1 4 While
this is not the only logical reading of the affidavit,'1 35 it is a logical one.
Because this was a summary judgment motion, the Court was obligated to accredit this logical interpretation of the federation's
36
affidavits.1
B.

The Issues Presented Were Ripe for Review

The land withdrawal review program was ripe for review. The
Court should have applied the rule of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner 137 to determine ripeness. Had the Court followed Abbott, it would
have found the program ripe for review. Such a finding would have
advanced the policy goals underlying the ripeness doctrine. 138 Finding
the program ripe for review would also have encouraged agency compliance with laws enacted to protect the environment.
1.

The Program Was Ripe for Review Under Abbott

Applying the Abbott standard to the facts in Lujan, the land withdrawal review program was ripe for review. The first part of the
Abbott test asks whether the issues presented were fit for judicial
review. ' Like the issues in Abbott, the issues presented by the federation's complaint were questions of law. 1" The federation alleged that
131. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187. The Lujan Court did not dispute that Peterson claimed to be
injured, only that she identified the land where her injury occurred. See id. at 3188-89. Because
the defendants did not dispute Peterson's veracity, the Court should believe her claim of injury.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (on summary judgment motion,
"evidence of non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his
favor" (emphasis added)).
132. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187 (Peterson's affidavit).
133. Id. at 3188. The South Pass-Green Mountain area includes approximately two million
acres. Of that area, 6500 acres were closed to mining prior to the BLM's program. The program
opened 4500 of these 6500 previously closed acres to mining. National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 331 (D.D.C. 1988) (Burford 111).
134. Burford IV, 878 F.2d. at 431.
135. For the Supreme Court's interpretation, see Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3187-89.
136. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962) (per curiam).
137. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
138. For a discussion of ripeness policies, see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
139. Abbott, 387 U.S. at 149.
140. One of the factors regarding whether issues are fit for judicial review is whether further
development of a factual record would be helpful to a reviewing court. See Abbott, 387 U.S. at
148-49. Because the BLM had expressed its belief that no further questions existed as to the
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the BLM acted illegally because it failed to follow the procedural
requirements of FLPMA and NEPA." The government defendants
denied that these laws applied to the program. 142 Whether or not
FLPMA and NEPA applied to the program were legal issues that
courts are uniquely qualified to decide.
The issues in Lujan also were ripe under the second part of the
Abbott test. Abbott's second element asks what hardships the parties
would face if review were denied.14 3 The federation faced harm to the
aesthetic enjoyment of the public lands that federation members
used. 1" This hardship could have been ameliorated only by reviewing
the program prior to completion of revocations. Once a revocation
became effective, it would not help to consider the revocation's environmental impacts. Because the damage caused by mining and oil and
gas exploration cannot be readily reversed, the program's potential for
causing the plaintiffs hardship was great.
The Lujan majority viewed the program too broadly when considering its ripeness. Because the program was in a state of flux and no
defining order existed, the majority found that the program was not a
discreet agency action amenable to judicial review.1 45 Instead of questioning whether all aspects of the program were ripe for review, the
Court should have considered the narrow question whether the
agency's decision on procedural requirements was ripe for review.
Failing to apply the two-part Abbott test to the narrow issues
presented impaired the Court from making an accurate determination
of the issues' ripeness for review. By looking at the program abstractly
instead of in concrete relation to the federation's suit, the majority
found the BLM's action unreviewable. The majority failed to consider, however, whether further agency decisionmaking would clarify
the issues. 146
The land withdrawal review program represented the BLM's final
view regarding FLPMA's and NEPA's applicability. The federation's
complaint alleged that the BLM had an informal policy of carrying
out the program without meeting preliminary procedural requireneed for procedural requirements in compliance with NEPA and FLPMA, see infra notes
151-55 and accompanying text, this issue was fit for review under that factor.
141. See Joint Appendix, supra note 75, at 11-23 (plaintiff's amended complaint).
142. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 317 (D.C. Cir 1987) (Burford I).
143. 387 U.S. at 149.
144. Joint Appendix supra note 75, at 12 (plaintiff's amended complaint); cf Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (harm to aesthetic values is injury recognized by APA).
145. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189 n.2 (1990).
146. For a discussion of the policy goal of ripeness to allow agencies to complete
decisionmaking prior to court intervention, see supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
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ments.' 47 The complaint was directed at correcting inadequacies in
the program's preliminary procedures, not the entire operation of the
program.1 48 The BLM had completed only a fraction of the procedures allegedly required by FLPMA. 4 9 Nonetheless, pursuant to the
program, the BLM had terminated classifications and withdrawals
affecting over 180 million acres.' 50 Further, the agency had clearly
expressed its opinion that the program was not subject to the FLPMA
and NEPA requirements. 5 1 Because the agency had finalized its decision regarding the legal effect of the FLPMA and NEPA on the program, the action was final despite its informality.
2. Finding the Program Unripefor Review Advances Undesirable
Policy Goals
The Supreme Court's decision in Lujan leads to an undesirable policy of allowing agencies to selectively ignore laws. The BLM was
allowed to insulate its actions from judicial review. The majority
found that without a defining order or regulation, the program could
not be reviewed.152 Because of the BLM's longstanding reputation for
153
favoring development interests over environmental preservation,
immunizing the BLM from judicial review is cause for concern. Based
on its reputation, it is not unlikely that the BLM would desire to avoid
having the program's compliance with FLPMA and NEPA scrutinized. If the BLM chose to disregard FLPMA and NEPA, that decision could be insulated from review. Had the BLM issued a formal
147. See Joint Appendix, supra note 75, at 11-23 (plaintiff's amended complaint); see also
supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing ripeness of informal agency actions).
148. See Joint Appendix, supra note 75, at 15-23 (plaintiffs' amended complaint).
149. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 277 (D.D.C. 1985) (Burford
I), aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Burford II).
150. See Joint Appendix, supra note 75, at 65, 103 (affidavits of Frank Edwards, assistant
director of Land Resources for the BLM). Technically, the classifications were terminated and
the withdrawals were revoked.
151. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Burford I1)
(finding the BLM had determined public participation and new resource management plans were
not required for the program).
152. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3189 n.2 (1990).
153. President Carter's Secretary of the Interior, Cecil Andrus, characterized the BLM as the
"Bureau of Livestock and Mining" in reference to the agency's "capture" by ranching and
mining interests. S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, FOREsT AND RANGE POLICY 344 (2d ed. 1980).
President Reagan's Interior Secretaries, James Watt and Donald Hodel, were both heavily
criticized by conservationists for overemphasizing resource development over conservation. E-g.,
N.Y. Times, March 3, 1986, at A12, col. 4. BLM director Robert Burford was also widely
reputed to be "enthusiastically pro-development and anti-wilderness," Coniff, Once the Secret
Domain of Miners and Ranchers, the BLM is Going Public, SMITHSONIAN, Sept. 1990, at 30, 33,
and had been repeatedly fined and cited for violating BLM rules as a rancher in Colorado, e.g.,
L.A. Times, May 21, 1989, pt. 1, at 24, col. 1.
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order stating that revocations and terminations could be completed
without the procedures mandated by the statutes, the Court would
have allowed judicial review of the order."5 Instead, the BLM did not
issue an order, but began carrying out the program without formal
action."' By implementing the program through informal channels,
the alleged decision to disregard the statutes remained too undefined

to meet the Lujan majority's requirements.' 56 Avoiding judicial
review by not promulgating regulations defining programs could result

in agencies disobeying laws without being subject to effective control.1 57 The Court should have avoided this undesirable result by finding the agency's informal action ripe for review.
Finding the program ripe for review would also encourage agency
compliance with environmental laws. By rejecting the program as
unripe, the majority allowed the BLM to construe FLPMA and
NEPA to avoid compliance with the statutes.' 58 This restricts the
courts from carrying out their role of interpreting disputed points of
law.'5 9 The Lujan Court should have allowed the district court to

determine whether the environmental laws mandated the relief the
federation sought. By failing to do so, the Court allowed decisions
impacting huge areas of land to be made without the balanced decisionmaking required by NEPA and FLPMA.'1

154. Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3189 n.2.
155. See supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (discussing lack of formal BLM action).
156. The federation's complaint alleged that the BLM had "issued various directives,
instructional memoranda, manuals and other documents" guiding BLM staff in carrying out the
program instead of issuing formal orders or regulations. Joint Appendix, supra note 75, at 20
(plaintiff's amended complaint); see also Respondent's Brief at 8, Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No. 89-640) (citing government affidavits describing various
informal methods of carrying out the program).
157. Although each revocation might be subject to review, the results of such disconnected
judicial review may not have significant impact on the whole program. See K. Sheldon, NWF v.
Lujan: Justice Scalia Restricts Environmental Standing to Constrain the Courts, 20 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10557, 10565 (1990).
158. Some agency actions are committed to agency discretion, such as decisions to bring
enforcement actions. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Where such enforcement
decisions are not involved, judicial review is precluded only if Congress has expressly legislated
such preclusion, or if there is no law for the courts to apply. See Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). InLujan, NEPA and FLPMA clearly provided law for
the courts to apply. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988); 43 U.S.C. § 1740 (1988).
159. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.")
160. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321; 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8).
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C. The Lujan Court May Have Been Trying to Reach an
UnarticulatedResult
The Lujan majority misapplied the standing doctrine to reach a specific outcome. The majority may have wanted to terminate the federation's suit for several reasons. First, refusing to review the BLM's
program is consistent with the Court's current trend towards judicial
restraint. Second, the majority may have wished to avoid interfering
with an agency program that had widespread effects on federal land.
Third, the majority may have wanted to quash a complaint that
sought environmental protection at the expense of development.
First, the Court's recent decisions have shown an increased desire to
restrain the federal courts from risking interference with the political
branches."' The Lujan decision can be explained as an extension of
this trend. In Lujan, the majority went to great lengths to find an
executive agency's actions unreviewable. The majority resorted to
mischaracterizing the court of appeals' decision,16 z and neglected to
apply or overturn precedent 6 3 to avoid scrutinizing the BLM's program. Judicial restraint in this case, however, does not advance significant protection of the political branches from judicial interference.
Judicial review of the BLM's program would not interfere with the
agency applying their expertise because the agency had already
reached their final conclusions regarding the applicability of FLPMA
and NEPA.' 6 Judicial restraint is also undesirable when it leads to
duly enacted laws being ignored by executive agencies.165
Second, the size of the land withdrawal review program may have
influenced the majority's decision. The program extended to nearly
180 million acres-an area larger than the states of Idaho, Oregon,
161. For a discussion of judicial restraint in the Court and its political effects, see Wright, The
Judicial Right and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A Defense of Judicial Activism in an Age of
Conservative Judges, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 488 (1987) ("'Judicial restraint' is the
shibboleth of the new, powerful judicial right, just as 'judicial activism' was their war cry ...in
the Warren era.").
162. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
163. The Lujan Court cited Abbott as the appropriate precedent for ripeness determinations,
110 S.Ct. 3177, 3190, 3191 n.4 (1990), but did not apply that precedent to the facts before the
Court. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50. The dissenting Justices had also brought
Diebold to bear on the discussion of summary judgment, 110 S. Ct. at 3196 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting), but the Court neither applied nor disavowed Diebold's precedent.
164. For a discussion of the finality of the BLM's decision, see supra notes 151-55 and
accompanying text.
165. See Levy & Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court's
Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 364-68 (1989) (discussing hazard that
judicial deference to administrative agency decisions will in effect lead to a choice by the courts
of agency policies over Congressional policies).
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and Washington combined. 66 Both the district court 16 7 and the
Supreme Court noted the amount of land involved.16 The Court
should not have been deterred from reviewing the program, however,
merely because it affected extensive lands. If an agency acts illegally,
the courts should intervene, regardless of the action's extent. 69
Courts should be especially concerned when allegedly illegal agency
action involves potential harm to millions of acres of public lands from
mineral and oil and gas exploration.1 70
Finally, economic concerns may have swayed the Lujan majority to
reach a desired decision. If the federation was successful on the merits, environmental concerns could have taken precedence over immediate economic gains. The government defendants in Lujan argued that
this case would result in environmental protection at the expense of
economic harm. 17 1 When faced with cases pitting environmental
interests against economic interests, the Court over the last fifteen
years has exhibited a reluctance to promote environmental interests.' 7 2
Justice Scalia, the author of the Lujan opinion, has made no secret of
his personal disdain for environmental lawsuits.' 73 The Court's reluctance to protect the environment, however, is improper, particularly
when Congress has explicitly legislated a policy that places environmental values on an equal footing with economic concerns. Both the
166. See Brief for the Petitioners at 13, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177
(1990) (No. 89-640). Idaho, Oregon, and Washington have an area of 156,910,080 acres. THE
WORLD ALMANAC 1991, at 624, 637, 642 (M. Hoffman ed.).
167. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D.D.C. 1988) (BurfordIII).
168. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3190 (1990).
169. See, ag., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973) (refusing to deny standing because harm complained of
would affect large part of the population). Although the SCRAP decision has been justifiably
criticized for allowing a tenuous chain of causation to serve as injury in fact, see, ag., Fletcher,
supra note 10, at 258-61, the Court sensibly ruled that widespread harm from the government is
irrelevant to the standing issue. 412 U.S. at 687.
170. Mining and oil and gas activities in the South Pass area of Wyoming, for example, could
threaten "crucial moose habitat, deer habitat, some elk habitat and... small game and bird
species." Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at 3195 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing a BLM report).
171. Petitioner's Brief at 13-15, Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990) (No.
89-640) (citing the effects of the preliminary injunction originally ordered by the district court in
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 277 (D.D.C. 1985) (Burford1), aff'd, 835
F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (BurfordII)).
172. See, eg., Levy & Glicksman, supra note 165, at 347 (arguing that the Court's decisions
since 1976 in environmental law cases have used restraint and activism alternatively to reach
results placing development over environmental protection).
173. See, Scalia, The Doctrineof Standing asan EssentialElement of the SeparationofPowers,
18 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 881, 884 (1983) (criticizing the courts' "long love affair with
environmental litigation").

Washington Law Review

Vol. 66:893, 1991

FLPMA and NEPA express policy decisions recognizing both environmental and economic concerns as important.17 4
V.

CONCLUSION

The Lujan majority incorrectly found that the National Wildlife
Federation had not proven standing. The majority rejected the federation's claims, finding that the federation's allegations were conclusory.
To reach and support their result, however, the majority disregarded
precedent and mischaracterized the court of appeals' decision in the
case. The majority failed to apply Diebold to the federation's evidence.
Because the federation's evidence could logically be read to make specific allegations, summary judgment was improper under DieboUl By
disregarding justifiable inferences, however, the Court was able to
grant summary judgment even though the federation averred a genuine issue of fact.
The majority also incorrectly found that the land withdrawal review
program was not ripe for review. The majority failed to follow Abbott
when addressing the ripeness issue. Applying Abbott to the federation's claims would show that the BLM's decision regarding the procedures necessary prior to carrying out the program was ripe for review.
Because the BLM had made a final decision, judicial review would not
improperly interfere with the agency's decisionmaking. Instead, the
majority relied on generalized characterizations of the BLM's informal program and declared the program unreviewable. Allowing the
federation's suit to proceed would also have had the desirable result of
encouraging agency compliance with duly enacted environmental
laws.
On opening the courthouse doors to see who was rapping, the Court
mistakenly found "darkness there and nothing more."175 The federation had knocked on the door loud and clear, and had met the requirements of standing and ripeness.
Michael J. Shinn

174. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1988) (ecological and environmental values should be protected
in public land management); 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988) (the purpose of NEPA is to encourage
harmony between population and environment and to promote protection of the environment).
175. Poe, supra note 1.
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